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DEPENDENCY, INTERDEPENDENCY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  









Why cannot all countries succeed in economic growth and development? In the 
second half of the last century, tremendous efforts have been devoted to identifying 
sources of success by some countries, albeit by ebb and flow and by crisis management,
1
The neo-classical literature has advocated free trade and open markets
 
and causes of failure by countries. All these efforts have failed to lead to a universally 
acceptable, malleable, and understandable framework of analysis for all to use. 
2 on the 
basis of the belief that it leads to division of labor, specialization, expansion of output, 
and increase in collective economic welfare.
3  In this “lifting all boats”
4
The capitalist development theories, modeled on the neo-classical theory, and 
make a distinction among the developed and less developed countries.  Less developed 
countries (LDCs) are analyzed mostly based on the “dual society” or “dual economy” 
concept.
  theoretical 
context, there is no distinction made between the northern or southern countries.  They 
are all treated as the same and therefore the same rules apply to each and everyone. 
5 They maintain that LDCs lack certain characteristics necessary for capitalist 
economic development that are present in developed countries.
6  Also, there are some 
undesirable characteristics present in less developed countries that have contributed to 
their underdevelopment that are removed or mitigated in their significance in developed 
countries.  Therefore, LDCs need to add the desirable characteristics of the developed 
world while removing the undesirable ones if they want to follow in the footsteps of the 
wealthier and more prosperous capitalist countries  ─ i.e., they need to go through the 
modernization process.
7  That is, they need to move toward learning and acquiring 
modern economic, political, and social attitudes
8 and institution of free market,
9 free 
enterprise, entrepreneurial spirit, social and political mobility, work ethic, democracy, 




11  also includes a large number of neo-Marxian books, 
articles, and monographs that maintain, not only free trade and foreign direct investment 
have not always benefited the third world countries
12, in majority of cases, they probably 
have contributed to their poverty.
13 As a matter of fact, they argue that the capitalist 
system of trade and investments have been hurdles to third world economic development 
rather than the engine that pulled the west to economic prominence.
14  This is partly 
because profits (surplus) of international trade and investment are taken out rather than 
reinvested in the dependent (periphery) countries, which have retarded the economy of 
the periphery and stimulated the core countries.
15
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    The new theoretical construct, 
   2 
dependency theory, celebrated the demise or the death
16  of the orthodoxy and 
introduction of a new paradigm in development analysis.
17
The dependency and the world system theories have been unsuccessful in 
explaining the evolutionary or revolutionary dynamics of economic underdevelopment.  
That is they have not clarified whether it is a transitional or a permanent state.  But by 
arguing that the periphery (satellite) changes to accommodate the core (metropolis) but 
does not crack the glass ceiling of underdevelopment, they imply that it is a permanent 
state of affairs.  In order to break out of this rut, or the only way to break out of the 
underdevelopment rut, a country needs to become independent and sever the its 
relationship with the dominant imperialist forces in the core (metropolis) that have 
blocked its development  ─  that  is,  the  only  way  to  prosperity  i s to engage in an 




 But they have not enumerated the process 
of development and sources of development capital and technology. What, then, is the 
real problem of the third world countries?  All agree to the answer, i.e., they agree that 
accumulation of capital was, is, and will remain the most significant problem of the third 
world (the south) countries.  The third world countries cannot accumulate capital because 
of low-income levels, which in turn, leads to low saving and investments. But low saving 
and hence low investments are responsible for low income.  A catch 22 problem for the 
third world countries that is badly in need of solutions. 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
  Since capital accumulation and capital deepening are for the sake of higher 
economic growth, what we need to establish is the direction of causality between saving, 
investment, and economic growth. Therefore, the question to be answered is whether 
saving is the driving force behind economic growth or is it investment that drives 
economic growth and saving will follow economic growth? The answer determines the 
proper fiscal and monetary policies necessary for economic growth. If the determining 
factor is investment, we need fiscal and monetary policies to spur investment and, if it is 
saving that jump-starts the process, policies that include incentives to save are required.  
From previous studies we know that there are high correlations between saving 
and income as well as between saving and investment.
20 But there are fewer consensuses 
on causality among them. That is, which one(s) is (are) the determining factor(s). 
Traditionally we have assumed that risks and profits drive investment, investment drives 




 investment will not materialize.   
Empirical Results   
A -- The data 
All of the data are extracted from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics electronic files.  As is the case, most macroeconomic data are non-
stationary.
22  However, in this case, using the Dickey-Fuller test
23
Name of the variable 
, the first differences 
are shown to be stationary at 1% level. 
D-F test statistic   critical value at 1% 
DRPI: change in real private investment  -5.675  -3.605 
DRS: change in real private saving  -6.509  -3.605 
DRYD: change in real income  -5.277  -3.621   3 
 
B -- The Granger Test 
  Econometric estimates of a relationship does not necessarily mean causality, it 
only implies dependence of one variable on a set of variables. In other contexts, there 
have been very lively discussions of causality, i.e., whether one variable, say DRPI, 
causes GDP to grow or GDP causes DRPI to grow.
24
GDPt = Σ αk DRPIt-k + Σ βj GDPt- k  + ε1t 
  That is whether we can detect a 
one way lead and lag relationship between the two variables.   The granger causality test 
purports to do just that.  It assumes that the information relevant for forecasting, say GDP 
is solely contained in DRPI and GDP.  It is important to remember that Granger causality 
measures precedent and not “causation,” as it is commonly understood. 
DRPIt = Σ γk DRPIt-k + Σ λj GDPt- k  + ε2t 
 
ε1t and ε2t are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated.  In the above specifications, 
GDP is assumed to depend on its own past values as well as those of DRPI.  Similarly 
DRPI is assumed to depend on its own past values as well as those of GDP.  For the 
existence of unidirectional causality from DRPI to GDP, we need to observe that αk to be 
statistically significant (i.e., Σ αk ≠ 0) and in the DRPI equation, λj need to be statistically 
significant (i.e., Σ γk ≠ 0). 
C – Granger Test Results 
  There are three causality hypotheses that we intend to test. In table 2 below, we 




  Null Hypothesis  # of obs.  F-Statistic  P-value 
1-a  DRPI does not Granger cause DRS  40  0.52570  0.47298 
1-b  DRS does not Granger cause DRPI  40  7.85685  0.00801 
2-a  DRPI does not Granger cause DRYD  40  0.85727  0.36050 
2-b  DRYD does not Granger cause DRPI   40  6.05189  0.01868 
 
  It appears that we would reject 1-b and 2-b and conclude one-way granger 
causalities running from savings to investment, and from disposable income to 
investment. This is true with one or more lagged values as independent variable. This 
means, we need undertake policies that foster savings to spur investment, and as a result, 
capital accumulation.   
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